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ACHIEVING FOLLOW-THROUGH:

THE ROLE OF AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY

IN THE TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE

by

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Preface

I started this research wanting to learn more about the U.S. Army civil affairs community. From its early days in World War II, to its reinvigoration during Vietnam, these uniformed professionals have acted as a bridge between the worlds of war and peace. They are a strategic resource, historically under-appreciated by their parent Service and unknown to most others in the defense community.

Along the way I discovered two things. First, the civil affairs community displays amazing initiative in pursuit of tasks that usually have strategic effects. Second, they often do this in the face of very limited guidance. This second observation eventually pulled my research in a new direction—focusing on the nature of our national strategy that should help guide civil affairs and countless other agencies and professionals involved in the chaotic transition from a state of war to a peaceful state.

I especially want to thank Michael Leonard, Director of the Strategy, Forces and Resources Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) for his enthusiastic support and encouragement during my IDA fellowship; and my IDA colleagues for their generous time and sage advice, including A. Martin Lidy, Samuel Packer, Donald Sampler, Dr. Robert Bovey and Rafael Bonoan. Dr Conrad Crane at the U.S. Army War College also helped target my selection of case studies. I also want to thank the United States Air Force for giving me this opportunity at IDA. Some might wonder what an Air Force officer is doing poking around civil affairs territory. My short answer is that transitioning from war to peace ought to be the business of

strategists from every service component. Air and space power certainly afford new ways of approaching this timeless problem, though that will have to be the topic of another paper.

Finally, since all plans (including those for research) fail to survive first contact with reality, I want to thank my wife and son for their patience and understanding. In this case, reality also involved the early end of my fellowship for yet another Air Force challenge. Jennifer and Kenny bore the brunt of an accelerated writing schedule but still kept me smiling.

I want to end this already lengthy preface by saying that this research topic has truly been an intellectual challenge and reward. I'm certain I have not done it justice in the pages written. I do hope I've at least developed some thoughts that might help in a small way to ensure that this great nation attacks the transition from war to peace with as much courage, determination, and thought as we apply to defeat our adversaries in battle. Carefully linking these two acts together is the right thing to do.

Abstract

This paper argues that the President can better achieve strategic follow-through in the transition from conflict to peace by crafting grand strategy for that event. Such a strategy should serve as a unifying mechanism through which the President exercises strategic leadership over the vast number of often loosely affiliated organizations involved in such operations. This study makes its case by first identifying the many advantages afforded by a transition grand strategy, while also including some realistic constraints that limit the ideal. Next, it compares two case studies that bracket the conflict spectrum as a way of examining transition grand strategy in action. Both cases exhibit a surprising degree of similarity both in terms of what worked and what failed. This study concludes with a recommended three-tracked approach to transition grand strategy that involves communication of presidential intent, an accountable and flexible interagency process, and regular evaluation of the integrated strategy.

Chapter 1

Introduction

In part, governments tend to lose sight of the ending of wars and the nation's interests that lie beyond it, precisely because fighting a war is an effort of such vast magnitude.

—Fred Charles Ikle'[1]

Follow-through: The concluding part of a stroke, as in golf or tennis, after a ball has been hit.

‾ Webster's II New College Dictionary [2]

This paper discusses war termination as a matter of practical application—an admittedly ambitious and optimistic goal given the host of unknowns, misperceptions, and emotions that plague the termination process.[3] Ending a war the way one wishes it to end is a matter of the utmost difficulty. The dynamism of the event is analogous to being swept along in an avalanche. Getting to the top and staying there, before the snow stops crashing down the mountainside and turns into cement, is likely the difference between life and death. In the case of war, a successful strategy for transitioning to a peaceful conclusion can have similar long-term implications—only this time the outcome is judged by the nature of the peace.

Two ideas drive this study's focus. First is the belief that without an American strategy for transitioning from war to peace, the United States is poorly positioned both to seek cooperation and avoid threats in the international community that have direct bearing on war

termination efforts and resulting long-term political outcomes. The second idea springs from the belief that the desired outcome of war is a better state of peace. Achieving that successful conclusion certainly is aided by a strategy that explicitly considers the mechanisms that bring about a desired long-term political end state. Combining these two ideas result in the assertion that the United States surrenders a tremendous ability to unify national action related to war when it fails to create and sustain a strategy for transitioning from conflict to peace. The answer, as this paper's title proclaims, should be a product of grand strategic follow-through.

At first glance, using "follow-through" to describe the act of transitioning from conflict to peace might appear somewhat misguided—akin to describing an athletic endeavor in which both the athlete and the game change in the course of one full swing (in fact, transitioning from conflict to peace does in some ways mirror such a statement). Yet, digging deeper into human physiology provides additional insight to the power of this concept. From this perspective, "follow-through" becomes an important organizing concept for the brain as it attempts to coordinate the myriad musculature actions required to execute an athletic skill. It is interesting that "coordination" takes on new meaning when viewed in this manner. Instead of being an administrative or technical term, coordination describes a purposeful act orchestrated by the mind. Or, in the case of grand strategy, coordination is what the President leads as he orchestrates (supported by the NSC staff) the myriad U.S. agencies (and attempts to influence countless other non-U.S. or non governmental actors) in unified action.

As a way of mapping a path to a better state of peace, this study argues that the President can achieve strategic follow-through by crafting grand strategy that specifically addresses conflict-peace transition events. Such a grand strategy would serve as a unifying mechanism through which the President exercises strategic leadership over the vast number of often loosely

affiliated organizations involved in such operations. Making such a case first requires exploration of the arguments both for and against emphasis of this complex transitional process. Next, this paper proposes the central elements of a conflict-peace transition grand strategy and tests the utility of such a construct through two contemporary case studies that approximate the bounds of the conflict spectrum (the 1991 liberation of Kuwait and 1994 operations in Haiti). Finally, this paper refines an approach to formulating conflict-peace transition grand strategy that is both relevant (based on case study observations) and realistic.   Ultimately, these tools will aid the President in exercising effective leadership over a matter of vital importance to the nation's well being. The closing days of the American Civil War are a reminder of the dramatic good that can result from a President's direct involvement in the transition from conflict to peace-- easily spelling the difference between a, "unifying and conclusive peace," and drawn-out conflict.[4]

Notes

[1] Fred Charles Ikle', *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 2.
[2] Webster's II: New College Dictionary (Boston, Ma.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2001), 435.
[3] Ikle. Ikle's work on this subject remains the gold standard.
[4] Michael E. Hill, "'April 1865,' The Month That Shaped a Nation," *Washington Post*, 13 April 2003.; Public opinion in the North, and even his own cabinet, favored a more punitive peace, while some Confederates, including Jefferson Davis, favored falling back into a guerilla-style war.

Chapter 2

Grand Strategy's Promise

The precise balance between the moral and the strategic elements of American foreign policy cannot be prescribed in the abstract. But the beginning of wisdom consists of recognizing that a balance needs to be struck.

—Henry Kissinger[1]

Definitions and Approach

If American grand strategy is to be useful, it must do more than simply shed light on the general trends of contemporary American foreign policy.[2] As a practical tool, grand strategy should serve as a means through which the President exercises strategic leadership over the course of national security issues. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America serves as a significant statement of current American grand strategy. In it, the President outlines his vision for America's role in the world, one in which the United States, "will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants… preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers… [and] extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."[3] In the span of 31 pages, the President builds upon his initial focus, crafting an extensive vision in which America will:

> Champion aspirations for human dignity; strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; work with others to defuse regional conflicts; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction; ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;

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develop agendas for cooperative action with the other main centers of global power; and to transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the Twenty-First Century.[4]

Grand Strategy: A Strategic Fulcrum

One of the fundamental challenges to implementing such a vision is the dynamic nature of the international environment. Recent media attention given to the question of long-term political solutions in both Afghanistan and Iraq is a constant reminder that grand strategy isn't a result of proclamation alone, it's often communicated more forcefully as a result of actions over time.[5] Few leadership challenges surpass those the President must face when considering the possibility of committing American military forces. This is not where grand strategy ceases to be relevant. Quite the contrary, this is where it has the potential to serve as a beacon in rough water. B.H. Liddell Hart recognized the value of grand strategy as a means of linking a state's actions in a military crisis to satisfactory long-term outcomes. He identified grand strategy as a concept that should,

> …look beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace—for its security and prosperity. The sorry state of peace, for both sides, that has followed most wars can be traced to the fact that, unlike strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part terra incognita—still awaiting exploration, and understanding.[6]

The prospect of armed conflict demands an extraordinary level of attention from the nation's chief executive and commander in chief for good reason—military and civilian lives are at risk. Yet, as Liddell Hart emphasized so well, lives lost in pursuit of legitimate military objectives are lives wasted if the result of military conflict falls short of the political aims that merited the use American combat forces in the first place.   Grand Strategy is a foundation for sound American leadership in the international community—reinforcing national resolve and ensuring long-term follow through.

The Transition from Conflict to Peace

Clausewitz described the nature of war as a mixture of violence, chance, and reason.[7] To him, victory depended greatly on having military leaders who possessed a genius to excel in this chaotic environment. What remained constant in this chaos was the primacy of the military organization and the continuity of the strong leadership. Though often less chaotic in terms of violence, the transition from war to peace contains its own instabilities that threaten achievement of a lasting peace in ways just as real as armed conflict. The path from combat operations to lasting peace is fraught with "bureaucratic faultlines" that separate military from civilian, government from non-government actors, US from coalition, and coalition from former adversary.[8] This turbulent time period is bounded at one end by the cessation of hostilities and, at the other, by the maximum attainment of a state's political objectives. Military planners define it as termination or transition.[9] Military and non-military actors commonly involved in post-conflict operations refer to it in a variety of other ways, including complex emergencies, peace operations, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction.[10] Members from both communities acknowledge that transition is a fundamental characteristic of this time period between war (or armed conflict) and peace. This paper proposes a hybrid term "conflict-peace transition" as a practical way of both capturing this slice of time for strategic evaluation and emphasizing it as a highly dynamic period that contains both the end of a military operation and the beginning of the return of a state to normalcy (meaning it is able to resume sovereign responsibility for its internal affairs and act responsibly on the international stage).

Analytical Approach

Given such an array of oft-competing forces in a conflict-peace transition, how does the United States best pursue its national security interests? This paper argues that the President can

better achieve strategic follow-through by crafting grand strategy that specifically addresses conflict-peace transition events. This grand strategy would serve as a unifying mechanism through which the President exercises strategic leadership over the vast number of often loosely affiliated organizations involved in such operations.

Making such a case first requires an exploration of the arguments both for and against emphasis of this complex transitional process. Next, this paper proposes the central elements of a conflict-peace transition grand strategy and tests the utility of such a construct through two contemporary case studies that approximate the bounds of the conflict spectrum (the Persian Gulf War and Haiti). Finally, this paper refines an approach to formulating conflict-peace transition grand strategy that is both relevant (based on case study observations) and realistic (recognizing the daily demands faced by the President).

Benefits

There are many arguments supporting the crafting of Presidential-level conflict-peace transition strategy in conflicts involving American military forces. As a whole, they all share a common trait, best described as a "connectedness" between military act and political result. This notion of linkage serves to underscore how the moral and practical aspects of conflict-peace transition grand strategy really are two sides of the same coin that can better enable Presidential leadership over complex issues.

Achievable Aim

This mutual support between moral and practical becomes immediately apparent when one examines the idea of achievable objects in war. In fact, one of the tests for determining whether the use-of-force is "just" requires one to gauge whether the war or intervention one is

considering stands a reasonable chance of success. The multidimensional military and political factors that play in such a determination demand more than a purely military evaluation.[11] Even the coldly rational Clausewitz would agree that no wise strategist would propose entering a conflict without having a very good feel for the prospects of the intended political result.[12]

Broad Perspective

"Needless to say, the judgment that destruction of a given range of targets will bring about the desired political result from the opponent's leaders is not a distinctly military judgment, but necessarily a political one."[13] Yet, do these kinds of issues merit Presidential attention? In many cases they do. Only the President enjoys the perspective that encompasses military and non-military (and domestic) elements of the nation's foreign policy and security activities. Eliot Cohen remarked on the value of such a perspective, stating:

> "An awareness of the unique character of a given political situation is only part of the statesman's art… What is equally important… is the ability to synthesize, to comprehend how a multiplicity of forces and conditions are interacting. The old metaphor of statesman as captain of a ship is just, but it applies best when though of as the conning of an exceedingly complex sailing vessel sailing through awkward seas."[14]

Precisely because the transition from conflict to peace covers such rough water, the President must set the course. Carnes Lord had chaos of conflict-peace transition in mind when he said.

> It is customary to talk of the need for "coordination" of the activities of the various agencies involved in such areas. Yet the term *coordination* is in reality wholly inadequate to describe what is required to develop coherent multiagency approaches to them. What is required is not coordination in an administrative or technical sense but the integration of divergent (and sometimes mutually antagonistic) perspectives through the active exercise of strategic thought.[15]

Grand strategy, then, can serve to communicate a President's unique perspective and truly coordinate actions in the attainment of political results from armed conflict.

Economy of Commitment

Today the United States faces two interlinked security challenges. First, a war against modern anti-US terrorist groups requires, "protracted global involvement," to deny these organizations sanctuary and state support.[16] Second, "if costs for a global war on terrorism are to be held to a level acceptable for American public support, a multilateral approach will have to dominate American grand strategy."[17] The current National Security Strategy begins to acknowledge this dilemma through a goal of "diminishing the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on areas most at risk."[18]

This argument applies equally well to regional challenges and major combat operations. During the planning of post-conflict operations in Iraq, the White House emphasized that one of the principle components of its humanitarian relief strategy was to, "rely primarily on civilian relief agencies."[19] Consequently, modern conflict-peace transition has to be planned with a detailed understanding of the breadth of organizations that have capabilities that can contribute to these operations—including Inter-Governmental, International, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) along with private sector firms.[20] Not considering all available organizations risks committing US resources in wasteful overlap and at levels Americans are unlikely to sustain willingly over time.

Continuity of Interest

The economic benefits of burden-sharing must be balanced against the cost of relying on organizations whose institutional and operational goals aren't always congruent with American policy objectives. While there are many NGOs, for example, that offer humanitarian relief capabilities—many are unwilling to operate in areas of high threat or within larger programs that

reflect political goals that might undermine perceptions of their organization's commitment to neutrality.[21] Moreover, the various organizations involved in conflict-peace transition operations emphasize different priorities and time horizons. Military organizations are sometimes accused of tunnel vision when they over-focus on an exit strategy that results in an end of military commitments and redeployment of forces to their home station.[22] In a similar way, some humanitarian assistance NGOs have much greater focus on immediate relief than organizations that specialize in longer-term reconstruction efforts.

Possibly the most compelling reason for having a US conflict-peace transition grand strategy is to equip American national security planners with an understanding of American objectives and priorities before they engage in transition planning at the coalition level. Armed with such an appreciation, planners could better identify the most appropriate partners for collaboration on specific transition goals and, conversely, to avoid other organizations not likely to share US priorities and commitment.

Accountability in Execution

While a vital first step, understanding core American interests in conflict-peace transition events falls far short of guaranteeing successful results. Another sign of successful transition planning is the ability to articulate ownership of key objectives—recognizing that the "owner" may change multiple times over the course of the transition. "Accountability in execution" describes an understanding at the grand strategic level first, about what US organization will be responsible for US Government leadership of key transition objectives and, second, of the various potential partners (and their capacity to deliver envisioned results) and planned transfers of responsibilities (or hand-offs) that will result ultimately in a defeated or dysfunctional-state's resumption of its sovereign responsibilities. Whether US organizations will

play a leading role in these operations will depend on issues discussed earlier, including US interests and identification of reliable partners as well as economic pressures. For example, the case cited earlier of US "outsourcing" of humanitarian assistance in Iraq, US objectives will most likely be accomplished by a number of non-US Government entities (though these organizations are often partially funded directly or indirectly by the US Government).

Drawbacks

Though the previous section made a number of arguments favoring a role for crafting a grand strategy as a means of executive leadership over US involvement in conflict-peace transition, there is still a strong case to be made against its over-articulation. Paul Hammond characterizes the argument against grand strategy as one dominated by "disincentives," and, "that these disincentives are serious enough to require that we take them into account and alter our goal," of adopting a national strategy from which action flows.[23]   This study groups disincentives into two categories.

Limits to External Feasibility

In some select cases, it is simply not possible to specify detailed objectives due to the totality of the conflict in which one is involved. America's adherence in World War II to the aim of unconditional surrender from the Axis Powers resulted from the inability of the United States and Great Britain to find agreement with the Soviet Union on objectives with greater detail.[24] In this case, the simplicity and totality of the objective was exceedingly important to the stability of the Alliance.

Interference with Desire for Political Options

Under circumstances where the crafting of detailed grand strategy is feasible, it still may not be desirable. Eliot Cohen remarks that, "because political objectives are just that— political—they are often ambiguous, contradictory, and uncertain."[25] When communicated publicly, detailed strategy can limit domestic and international flexibility of the President. On the domestic front:

> From the standpoint of the president, agencies want guidance for a mixture of good and bad reasons. The good reasons facilitate their design and implementation of effective programs and their accountability for these programs. The bad reasons—bad from the standpoint of the president—reduce the uncertainty these agencies must deal with.[26]

In a similar vein, the President must often achieve flexibility through ambiguity when communicating to an international audience:

> A certain amount of reticence is necessary with respect to our basic policies in order to be able to say different things to different foreign audiences as well as domestic audiences. …[Hence t]he need, when dealing with guidance for planning and operations, for the U.S. government to threaten and reassure allies and adversaries, to leave them puzzled or keep them in the dark—the need that requires the president and his agent to speak in different and sometimes quite inconsistent or, at best, in ambiguous terms.[27]

The results of these disincentives can leave transition planners with fuzzy guidance at best, as this next quote regarding conflict termination in Germany emphasizes so well:

> Roosevelt's behavior kept open the question of how to deal with Germany after the war. Had he agreed to a clear, unambiguous policy, it very likely would have been the wrong one. Roosevelt's chaotic management style kept open a range of options that ran from the Morgenthau Plan, which was severely punitive, to a peace of reconciliation, which elements in the State and War Departments favored. When he died, Truman inherited the chaos—and the range of options.[28]

While military officers sought more detailed guidance for post-conflict planning, it was not available—due again to disagreements among the Allies.[29] Though certainly not a pretty picture in terms of a cohesive and comprehensive grand strategy for conflict-peace transition, this

example shows that, even under the highly constrained strategic environment of World War II, the President sought to give at least a range of directions about transition objectives.

Conclusion

Given the many benefits discussed earlier, then, the potential exists for grand strategy to better unify operations in a conflict-peace transition. One must be careful, however, to recognize the aspects of grand strategy that might constrain presidential flexibility. In order to explore how the President might better leverage grand strategy in conflict-peace transition, the next chapter proposes a measurable definition of strategy. It then applies that definition to evaluate the degree to which US grand strategy was employed in actual conflict-peace transition events.

Notes

[1] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 812.
[2] This paper adopts the following definition of grand strategy, "The coordinated packaging and use of all the instruments of power, military and nonmilitary, at the disposal of a nation or an alliance to attain prescribed objectives." See: Gregory D. Foster, "A Conceptual Foundation for the Development of Strategy," in *Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process*, ed. James C. Gaston (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, April 1992), 72.
[3] *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (The White House, Washington: Government Printing Office, September 2002), iv.
[4] Ibid., vii.
[5] "After the War is Over," *Economist*, 8-14 March 2003, 26-28.; Hugh Pope and David S. Cloud, "Ethnic, Religious, Political Rifts Test U.S. Hopes For Stable Iraq," Wall Street Journal, 11 December 2002.; "The Rebirth of a Nation," Economist, 11-17 January 2003, 33-34.; Scott Baldauf, "Despite Iraq, US Raising Its Presence in Kabul," *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 February 2003, 1.
[6] B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967), 322.
[7] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.
[8] Carnes Lord, "Strategy and Organization at the National Level," in *Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process*, ed. James C. Gaston (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, April 1992), 143.
[9] Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 10 September 2001, I-10-12, III-19, 21, and 24-25.
[10] There are almost as many terms pertaining to this transitional area as there are organizations involved in it. Within the military, far more is written about the detailed

interactions between military and non-military organizations in a volume of doctrine pertaining to military operations other than war. This author has uncovered no convincing argument why conflict-peace transition should be thought of as something pertaining to only a certain class of conflict. Though certainly every situation featuring combat operations is unique, both sets of doctrine (capstone and MOOTW) discuss termination and transition. This paper views conflict-peace transition as a strategic problem that applies to both major combat operations and smaller scale contingencies. See Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 16 June 1995; Joint Publication 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, 8 February 2001; and A. Martin Lidy et al., *Potential Global Partners for Smaller-Scale Contingencies*, IDA Report IDA-D-2349 (Alexandria, Va.: IDA, August 2000).

[11] Martin L. Cook, "The Proper Role of Professional Military Advice in Contemporary Uses of Force," *Parameters*, Winter 2002-03, 26.

[12] von Clausewitz, 87 and 605.

[13] Cook, 26.

[14] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 212.

[15] Lord, 144.

[16] David Jablonsky, "The State of the National Security State," *Parameters*, Winter 2002-03, p 13.

[17] Ibid., 13.

[18] *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 6.

[19] *White House Office of Global Communications Fact Sheet: Humanitarian Assistance Preparations for Iraq*, 26 February 2003, 1-2.

[20] A. Martin Lidy, "Focus Paper: Achieving Unity of Effort During Complex Contingencies," in *Handbook on the Analysis of Smaller-scale Contingency Operations in Long Term Defence Planning*, NATO Research and Technology Board Panel on Studies, Analysis and Simulation, (SAS-027) Technical Team on Analysis of Smaller-scale Contingency Operations, 16 December 2002, 9-17.

[21] Daniel L. Byman, "Uncertain Partners: NGOs and the Military," *Survival* 43, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 104-105.; and Harold Kennedy, "Pentagon Broadens Duties For Its Civil Affairs Teams," *National Defense*, 1 February 2003, 36.

[22] Byman, pp 105-106.

[23] Paul Y. Hammond, "The Development of National Strategy in the Executive Branch: Overcoming Disincentives," in *Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process*, ed. James C. Gaston (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, April 1992), 3.

[24] Ikle', 86.

[25] Cohen, 241.

[26] Hammond, 11.

[27] Ibid, 14.

[28] Ibid, 13.

[29] F. S. V. Donnison, *Civil Affairs and Military Government, North-West Europe, 1944-1946* (London: HM Stationery Office, 1961), 463.

Chapter 3

Searching for Signs of Grand Strategy

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.

— Carl von Clausewitz [1]

There are no "safe areas" in Haiti.

— U.S. Department of State, 2002 [2]

Bounding the Problem

The purpose of this chapter is to structure better the discussion of conflict-peace transition in two ways. First, in order to better examine the role of American grand strategy in the aftermath of conflict, it defines grand strategy in a way more conducive to observation. Second, it bounds the universe of conflict scenarios in which this approach might apply-- comparing two recent cases involving the use (or threatened use) of American combat forces. The 1991 liberation of Kuwait by US-led coalition forces serves as high-end example of a major combat operation, while the 1994 "intervasion" of Haiti approximates the lower-end of the lethal conflict spectrum. [3]

Four Tests

Though Liddell Hart defined the role of grand strategy as, "to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, toward the attainment of the politcal [sic] object,"

he precedes that by stating, "strategy is an application on a lower plane of grand strategy."[4] Given that close relationship, this paper makes use of a general depiction of strategy as a surrogate for grand strategy, to allow the evaluation of grand strategy in action. "Strategy is art of using resources to attain ends," and consists of three major components: aims, means, and ways (or methods).[5] By adding a feedback element (which this study will refer to as "evaluation"), one has a four-part series of tests through which one can begin to observe grand strategy in action.

Of these four elements, grand strategic aim is certainly the most vital, since it captures the conditions one intends to create as a result of the conflict. As are the other three tests, "grand strategic aim" is defined quite loosely for the purpose of this analysis. It may be articulated in terms of national interests, political interests, or as more detailed objectives (possibly even by functional categories or sectors).[6] It might also include priorities among multiple interests or objectives as well as end states—and related measures of merit or key events constituting success. Time is another important factor. The early or late communication of aim has great bearing on how thoroughly it can be planned for and executed.

While "aim" captures the purpose of grand strategy, "means" describe the resource pool from which conflict-peace transition planning and operations can draw. In this study's liberal definition, it could include statements that differentiate between resources that are expected or assumed for an operation and ones that are desired (but must still be attained through negotiation). It would also include mention of organizations acting as a center of gravity for specific objectives and, finally, possible statements about levels of funding (US government, coalition, and other significant sources) and numbers of personnel.

Grand strategic "ways" is perhaps the most complex of the four tests. It contains the connective tissue that in large part ties together strategic aims and resources. It could begin by outlining lead US agencies for various objectives. It might also include discussion of the nature, if necessary, of US control or collaboration within the interagency process, as well as the nature of national, coalition, or international command relationships and collaboration. Finally, it could also include discussion of key transitions between organizations that ultimately result in the assumption by the former enemy state (or failed state) of its sovereign responsibilities.

The final test, grand strategic "evaluation" captures the feedback or assessment provided to the President or his designated representative about a conflict-peace transition plan's ability to succeed. For ongoing operations, it contains a measure of progress toward stated objectives. For both planned and ongoing operations, it also contains an assessment of risk (in terms of mismatch between capabilities available, objectives, and the expected or observed environment).

The Grand Strategic Dividing Line

Since the purpose of this study is to evaluate the utility of grand strategy as a tool for Presidential leadership over conflict-peace transition events, it emphasizes actions taken at the national level, including Presidential, cabinet-level, and interagency events. Though it does recognize in some cases the actions of subordinate organizations involved in the theater of operations, including US embassies, these discussions are limited to situations in which 1) no higher level strategy existed and that fact resulted in dire consequences for operational-level organizations or 2) significant events occurred at the operational level that had direct bearing on grand strategy. Finally, it is important to note that this study relies largely on secondary sources for its evaluation of the interagency process. Though a great majority of the information

surrounding specific interagency meetings is classified, there exists a reasonable amount of secondary information that affords one some general insights.

Grand Strategy in Action

After this author's review of several case studies and after action reports pertaining to Operations in Haiti and the Persian Gulf War, there exist a surprising number of similarities between the two in terms of how the various elements of American conflict-peace transition grand strategy both did and did not take shape. Certainly the operations were far from similar in terms of their cause and scope. The 1991 liberation of Kuwait by a US-led coalition of over 1 million military personnel was a response to Iraq's earlier invasion and occupation of a sovereign state.[7] The 1994 intervasion of Haiti, a result of failures internal to Haiti's government and military, involved at its height only 20,000 Multi-National Force personnel.[8] The differences in forces committed make these two conflicts good recent representations of a higher-end and lower-end conflict (or, in current defense terminology, a major combat operation and a smaller scale contingency). In order to compare and contrast the grand strategic common ground shared by these two conflicts, this section reviews the conflicts in tandem from the perspective of the four tests for grand strategy outlined earlier.

Aim

With respect to overall American aims in these two conflicts, there existed a curious mix of imprecise public directions from the President combined with sufficiently detailed guidance from other sources that served as statements of national aim. On August 5th, 1990, President Bush made a public commitment that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, "will not stand."[9] More precise aims were articulated in a series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, resulting in two

straightforward goals, "liberat[ing] Kuwait, and mak[ing] Iraq account for and compensate victims for Iraq's transgressions."[10] The two military end states CENTCOM derived from these statements of aim were, "the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait and regional stability."[11] There were no end states specific to conflict-peace transition articulated above the level of CENTCOM.[12] As will be discussed in more detail later, these aims proved to be sufficient for the purpose of planning and executing post-conflict operations in Kuwait.

Haiti featured even less explicit public guidance from the President. National aim, for those involved in the early planning stages for UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, "began with a vague notion that its objectives would be the restoration of democracy, the stanching of the refugee flow to the United States, and the enhancement of the credibility of the United Nations and OAS as well as the United States."[13] Fortunately, UNSCR 940 provided fairly detailed guidance for the both the initial Multinational Force (MNF) and a subsequent United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The MNF's charter included removing the Haitian military leadership, restoring Haiti's elected President, and establishing a secure and stable environment that would allow transfer of operations to UN control. UNMIH's follow-on charter included sustaining the secure and stable environment, professionalizing the Haitian armed forces and creating a separate police force, and, "assist[ing] the legitimate constitutional authorities of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections."[14] The UN force commander envisioned an end state that included, " A safe and secure environment with a functional and duly elected national government; a professional public security force loyal to the constitution and the national leadership; and a growing economy focusing on improving the infrastructure, improving public utilities, and reducing unemployment."[15] Again, these "aims" served as a starting point for detailed conflict-peace transition planning.

Though explicit statements of national aim seemed at least adequate, the timing of the statements (and follow-on guidance pertaining specifically to conflict-peace transition) was a topic of frustration common among planners in both conflicts. Kuwait's Ambassador to the United States appears to have initiated the process in early October of 1990 that ultimately resulted in an interagency planning team focusing on the reconstruction of Kuwait.[16] In-theater, CENTCOM didn't really begin post-conflict planning until mid-January 1991.[17] The result in this case was a best-case period of 5 months for general planning and a far more compressed window for in-theater detailed planning of less than 6 weeks.

Haiti presented similar time constraints. "Interagency planning was frustrated until May 1994, when President Clinton announced the Administration's policy change to consider the use of force."[18] Moreover, UNSCR 940's detailed guidance wasn't adopted until July 31st, 1994.[19] These dates again afforded planners about 5 months of general planning for conflict-peace transition and 6 weeks to incorporate more detailed objectives.

Also common to these conflicts was the interplay between political interests and secondary objectives.   In the case of Haiti, President Clinton felt pressured on three fronts--first by the Congressional Black Caucus, which was unhappy with the slow pace of returning President Aristide to Haiti.   Second, the President felt he had to deal with an immigration crisis (which also had Congressional Black Caucus interest) that involved both Haitians and Cubans attempting to flee to the United States. Finally, the President felt his own credibility being threatened in the aftermath of US failures in Somalia and the October 1993 embarrassment in which the USS Harlan County (filled with UN forces intended to implement a UN-brokered agreement to restore President Aristide) was turned-away from Haiti by an armed mob.[20] These political interests may have resulted in pressures on the operation to limit risks that could result

in US casualties and to overly-emphasize efforts to limit reports of Haitian on Haitian violence (which could jeopardize President Aristide's perceived legitimacy).[21]

Persian Gulf planners in 1990 found similar forces at play. Though it seems that the need to sustain a large coalition helped limit the number of explicit objectives there did appear a number of secondary objectives. The origin of these objectives, while not always clear, appear to be reasonable Administration concerns. The first example involves a lesser-known U.S. objective to democratize Kuwait. A second objective could have resulted from a significant public campaign to encourage the ouster of Saddam Hussein from power.[22] How these secondary objectives influenced post-conflict planning will be discussed later when this paper considers the fourth test of grand strategy—evaluation.

Assessment: Both situations displayed a number of similar qualities related to aim. They can be best summarized as: imprecise presidential direction, clarified by other significant sources, but only at the last minute. Public pronouncements from the President that could be construed as aim were rare. What did help in both circumstances was the clarification through United Nations Security Council Resolutions—products of negotiation. Unfortunately, both operations experienced aim-related delays that significantly delayed detailed transition planning. Finally, both situations benefited from greater aim-related detail in military operational plans—a partial success at best, since non-military government agencies (not controlled by the military) were participating in the larger transition operation. These findings seem to agree with the observations in the first chapter that Presidents don't always view as beneficial clear statements of aim as being beneficial, though operational planners who are focused on planning to achieve concrete objectives certainly prefer more specificity.

Means

It appears that for both the Persian Gulf War and Haiti there was little means-related guidance for conflict-peace termination. When it did exist in planning for the liberation of Kuwait, it was more a function of serendipity. Early planning efforts were a result of the initiative taken by an Army Reserve Civil Affairs officer, Col Randall Elliot, whose civilian employer happened to be the US State Department. Col Elliott worked "literally across the hall from… his good friend Edward "Skip" Gnehm, the ambassador designate of the United States to Kuwait." Their early efforts resulted in the Kuwait Task Force (KTF), an organization staffed by mainly Army civil affairs personnel, chartered to plan for the reconstruction of Kuwait, and "organized under the interagency mandate of the Departments of Defense and State."[23] This discussion is pertinent to the means test, because:

> Early in the activities of the KTF, Colonel Elliott was directed by Lieutenant General Michael Carns, the Secretary of the Joint Staff, to fully involve the rest of the U.S. government. This resulted from a 'lesson learned' from the Panama experience, where the U.S. Army had been left holding the economic bag after other agencies reneged on promises to help fund emergency restoration. As result, by the time the KTF deployed to Saudi Arabia, Elliott had involved 27 separated federal agencies.[24]

So, even though not a great deal of early guidance existed regarding funding for reconstruction efforts, the Joint Staff-directed push toward interagency planning was in large part an attempt to pull in other agencies to share in planning and in any funding burden.

Adding to the uniqueness of the Kuwait situation though, was the fairly quick realization on the part of planners that the exiled Kuwaiti government had the ability and willingness to finance its own reconstruction.[25] Kuwaiti officials, "dispatched a team of 20 specialists to Washington to plan for the emergency response after Kuwait was liberated and to enlist U.S. government assistance in the planning."[26] This group became known as the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program (KERP). In fact, the KTF was in large part the U.S. answer to the KERP's

early attempts to find American planning expertise.[27] Though Kuwait did have the ability to pay, AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) proved to be a valuable ally of the KTF. Again, serendipity prevailed, OFDA's director, Andrew Natsios, was a Army Reserve major. "Elliot immediately brought Natsios into the KTF as executive officer, and Natsios brought his civilian agency checkbook with him."[28] Finally, due to a briefing the KTF arranged early on for the KERP, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers became heavily involved in reconstruction planning and execution.[29]

Resource definitions were marginally better for Haiti planners. On a positive note, the interagency process appears to have been initiated much more aggressively. "Strategic planning took place in the Executive Committee (Ex-Com) which began operation in May under NSC leadership and included the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury, the CIA, and AID."[30] Unfortunately, it also appears that much of the planning had to take place without a firm notion of the funding that would be available to the different agencies. In their critique of peace operations in Haiti, Margaret Hayes and Gary Wheatley state, "without appropriated resources, agencies could only contemplate what they would do."[31]

In the case of Haiti, means-related guidance also existed for personnel. UNSCR 940 did include mention of a personnel cap of 6,000 for the UNMIH. This was valuable information for planners who had to plan a handoff from an MNF of 20,000. This information forced an early evaluation of operational priorities and allowed for an effective adjustment of operations during the MNF's existence as well as a smooth transfer of responsibility from the MNF to UNMIH.[32]

Assessment: These two case studies again reveal similar findings. First, in both cases, neither team received a great deal of means-related guidance. A lack of funding guidance caused problems for Haiti planners, while in the Kuwait case the rather unique situation of a wealthy

government in exile with access to its financial resources virtually eliminated this as an issue. The Haiti experience does seem to track again with chapter one observations about perceived drawbacks to grand strategy. In this case, Presidents don't always want to reduce political uncertainty (of which budgetary uncertainty is definitely a subset)—while operational planners again seek specific resource commitments from which they can estimate the capability they will deliver over time.

Two additional means-related insights merit discussion. A product of the interagency process in both cases was the inclusion of a significant number of U.S. federal agencies in the planning process. Though this may smack of stating the obvious, it is a success common to the 2 cases that a variety of agencies were involved in the complexities of transition planning. Second, for Haiti, a decrease in overall personnel (from the MNF to the UNMIH) was announced early as part of a key transition during the operation. Making this constraint known beforehand did help planners modify the operation to degrade gracefully and continue focusing on the most important objectives.

Ways

When examining this third test of conflict-peace transition grand strategy, one quickly appreciates how quickly the tactical and grand strategic can interact. Though there was probably more discussion of grand-strategic "ways" in the interagency process than any other element, it was also the most varied in terms of its utility. This paper will review two significant elements in this discussion: 1) the interagency process and 2) the planning and execution of handoffs between organizations.

The Interagency Process: Both conflicts in this study experienced roughly similar results during the interagency process. In the end, responsibilities were defined fairly well,

though there was a significant lack of senior decision-makers authorized to resolve planning disconnects in a timely manner.

As the means discussion already covered, reconstruction planning for Kuwait did utilize the interagency process. Still, getting agreement on primary responsibilities was a time consuming and imperfect process. In addition to Joint Staff concerns regarding funding of reconstruction efforts, the Army hesitated to support the planning efforts, "fear[ing] they would be saddled with a mission that could last for months or even years."[33] Some Pentagon officials also questioned whether the State Department might be the more appropriate lead for such an activity.[34] The result of this bureaucratic process was a time delay of approximately two weeks during mid November during which little progress was made on the planning front. Only when the Office of the Secretary of Defense began to push this issue, a result of the combined efforts of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Henry S. Rowen, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, James R. Locher III., did the interagency process fall into place.[35]

Transition planning for Kuwait exhibited two other sources of friction. The first was a result of the Kuwaitis' significant role in the planning process. The KERP's reluctance to expedite its decision-making (through drawn-out negotiations, omission of key logistics factors, and a reluctance to hire a general contractor) created a situation in which, by January 11th, only 11 contracts had been signed.[36] The second source of planning friction was the lack of communication between interagency planners (of which the KTF acted as the hub) and theater planners in CENTCOM. The unfortunate result of this disconnect was discovered in early January. The Civil Affairs annex, authored in Washington DC, had significant gaps with respect to the overall theater plan. Most significant was a lack of emphasis on, "the provision of

immediate services to the liberated population."[37] Fortunately, CENTCOM had spent more time on that portion of the plan, while the KTF had focused its efforts on the longer-term reconstruction.[38]

In comparison, Haiti interagency planning efforts started much more smoothly. While some interagency planning began in early spring of 1994, strategic planning began in May under NSC leadership, and AID, "began developing its own plans for assisting democratic forces and for training a new police force."[39] In their critique of the interagency process for Haiti, Hayes and Wheatley state that, "while not perfect, there was good planning by individual agencies. Plans were made for both forceful and permissive entries, and the permissive plan involved some interagency coordination."[40]

One case illustrates the complexity of cross agency planning and the depth of coordination required for success. In this example, US AID worked closely with SOLIC over the course of the summer. Moreover, AID's OFDA team even arrived at Ft Drum, home of the 10th Mountain Division, 10 days prior to the operation. Still, that didn't stop the OFDA team from missing the plane to Haiti, when it was discovered too late that this crucial team was not part of the initial force flow planned by the military.[41]

Haiti's interagency planning efforts lacked sufficient deconfliction between the plans drafted by various organizations. On this shortfall, Hayes and Wheatley found that, "while strategic planning took place under NSC leadership, concrete decisions were postponed to the last minute, so policy guidance could not be communicated effectively to the operational level commanders."[42] USACOM chaired an interagency rehearsal on 12 September:

> The meeting marked the first time that all of the senior civilian and military player
> met to discuss the pending Haiti operation. The meeting was widely regarded as
> too large and unfocused, but it highlighted the coordination that remained to be

done. A subsequent smaller meeting, chaired by the NSC staff, brought key players together again and resolved much of the confusion.[43]

Kuwait planners, through the participation of the KERP, largely avoided similar problems. Whether or not by conscious decision, the effective result of Kuwait's participation in the reconstruction planning process was to offload from the interagency process to the Kuwaitis many potential reconstruction issues, including the setting of priorities.[44]

The Planning and Execution of Handoffs Between Organizations: The second half of the ways test evaluates at the grand strategic level the planning and execution of transfers of responsibility between organizations.

Kuwait operations saw a large number of organizational transfers as the conflict-peace transition efforts unfolded. As mentioned earlier, Kuwait' KERP and the U.S. Government's KTF served as the hub of national-level planning prior to the beginning of coalition offensive operations. In the theater of operations, CENTCOM delegated a majority of the post-conflict transition planning to ARCENT, CENTCOM's U.S. Army component.[45] In January, the KTF deployed to Saudi Arabia and immediately found itself the subject of a tug-of-war between the U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait and CENTCOM, both wanting the organization's expertise.[46] While CENTCOM and the Ambassador were reaching a compromise of sorts, ARCENT made a fairly significant organizational change—creating Task Force Freedom to execute the tasks related to the liberation and reconstruction of Kuwait. Its, "mission was short-term—to provide emergency support only," to include damage assessments—in anticipation of a handoff of reconstruction responsibilities to the Secretary of the Army.[47] The final organizational evolution took place in early March, when the Secretary of Defense created the Defense Reconstruction Assistance Office (DRAO) to coordinate better reconstruction efforts and to link them to top-level DoD oversight.[48] This response was due in part to fears that a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-led

effort in Kuwait (the KERP had hired them to act as general contractor for reconstruction) could evolve into an unwanted long-term commitment.[49]

Haiti saw far less complexity in terms of major handoffs in the conflict-peace transition process. There existed three major organizations over the course of planning and execution for UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The first was the interagency process itself. The second was the multinational force (for which USACOM served as the primary planner). UNMIH was the final organization.

In Kuwait, most of the organizational changes and transfers took place without a great deal of advance planning. As noted earlier, the KERP and KTF came into being in the autumn of 1990. The subsequent deployment of the KTF to Saudi Arabia was actually the result of a January request from the Kuwait's deputy prime minister (the KERP and KTF deployed to Saudi Arabia by the end of January).[50] Task Force Freedom was also the product of a fairly detached approach to post-conflict planning—this time by CENTCOM. Though it wasn't formulated until 20 February (it saw its first action in Kuwait on 1 March), Task Force Freedom was an innovative combination of civil affairs, engineers, and other support personnel necessary to undertake such a complex operation.[51]

Probably the most significant decision regarding transfers of authority took place in early March 1991 when Secretary Cheney specified that recovery assistance to Kuwait would occur in two phases: emergency and reconstruction. Operational control for DoD's involvement would transfer from CENTCOM to the U.S. Army (as Executive Agent) at the completion of the first phase. This same guidance recognized that no activities would take place without Ambassador Gnehm's approval.[52] Though there appears to have been some thought given to the conditions that would be necessary for transferring responsibility, it is not clear that they were ever fully

established. What is clear is that, after receiving a favorable report on the progress of Task Force Freedom, "on 8 April, General Schwartzkopf recommended to Secretary of Defense Cheney that he declare 30 April as the official end of the emergency phase," which the Secretary approved.[53]

When it came to planning for transfers of responsibility, Haiti again seemed to improve on the marginal track record established during the Persian Gulf War. As noted earlier, the interagency process started more smoothly for Haiti planning. The only significant disconnect related to transferring responsibilities occurred late in the planning stages at a USACOM-hosted interagency dry run. Again, as covered earlier, this failed initial session required an NSC-led second session to link together the most essential portions of the plan prior to its execution. Adding greatly to early planning for transfers between MNF and UNMIH was the adoption of the well-written UNSCR 940. It even included a provision for an advance party of UNMIH members to begin working the transfer problem.[54]

The transition from MNF to UNMIH was product of thoughtful preparation. The UN Force Commander, Major General Joseph Kinzer, U.S. Army, even devised the transition criteria:

> Although all of the criteria had not been totally met, enough had been accomplished to ensure success. These completed objectives included an agreed upon budget for the Force, the declaration of a secure and stable environment for the conduct of peacekeeping operations, 95% of the forces present in theater, 85% of the staff present and trained, an established and tested communications system, a [quick reaction force] in place and rehearsed, a functioning logistics system, and an agreement in place to maintain logistics and support service for the force in Haiti.[55]

The result was that, "on 10 January 1995, the UN Security Council declared that a safe and secure environment had been established and UNMIH could take control of the operation. This occurred on 31 March 1995."[56]

A source of transition tension common to both operations in this study was the failure to adequately delineate responsibilities between DoD and State. For Kuwait planning, as already mentioned, these tensions surfaced early in the interagency process. Though they improved somewhat over the course of the Persian Gulf War, they were never trouble-free. The deployment of the KTF to Saudi Arabia is an excellent example, where Ambassador Gnehm sought the same level of control in-theater as he had over the KTF in the interagency process. CENTCOM, on the other hand, viewed the KTF as a valuable source of military manpower to be used as theater priorities required. Though Secretary Cheney's guidance helped in some cases (ensuring the Ambassador had approval authority in both the emergency and reconstruction phases), personalities had to overcome the frequently knotted lines of authority that existed in these operations.

Fortunately, there was a strong sense of cooperation among the senior transition planners and leaders within the Kuwait theater. Some of it, as already noted, was a product of good fortune. Ambassador Gnehm's personal ties to Col Elliot of the KTF allowed for close cooperation in theater, even though the KTF was attached to CENTCOM.[57] In other cases, cooperation was simply a result of professionalism and lessons learned along the way. The transfer of responsibilities to DRAO is an excellent example. Though it was chartered to report to the Secretary of Defense, through the Secretary of the Army, DRAO had significant coordination responsibilities with both CENTCOM and the U.S. Ambassador. DRAO was careful to emphasize that, "all policy decisions required the concurrence of the United States Ambassador."[58]

For Haiti, the friction between DoD and State was more insidious but no less distracting to a unified national effort:

In Haiti, the U.S. military operation was only one leg of a triad that included restoring democratic institutions and rebuilding the ravaged economy. While the military was essential in providing internal stability, it was largely irrelevant to the other activities, especially since forces were directed not to conduct nation building activities. Military participants at [an interagency] workshop lamented that "there was no one in charge of the over-all operation." They perceived a need for an operational level commander who would coordinate and direct all the agencies and forces involved. Some believed that this should be the Force Commander, others felt that it should be the Ambassador.[59]

Though the Force Commander and Ambassador were again able to cooperate and coordinate in a satisfactory way, this was a second-best solution that would have been helped greatly by a number of other actions, including better strategic guidance on overall command relationships, setting up a combined war room, increasing U.S. Embassy staffing to handle the workload, or establishing a CONUS-based task force to assist the Ambassador in leading interagency planning.[60]

Assessment—The state of means-related grand strategic guidance in these two cases is best described as fairly well-defined lanes in the road without a traffic cop in sight. In the overall IA process, it appears that some learning may have taken place between 1991 and 1994. The start up of the IA process was far less painful during Haiti. Similar conclusions seem appropriate when assessing the planning of handoffs in these two cases. Haiti's well-defined and relatively small number of organizational transfers was a dramatic improvement over the Kuwait case's large number of last minute handoffs.

However, effective deconfliction at the interagency level existed in neither of these cases. Personal ties and a commitment to cooperation seemed to mitigate the negative effects in the Kuwait case. In Haiti, the results of not having a strong interagency traffic cop became apparent only late in the planning process during an interagency rehearsal.

Closely related to the deconfliction issue is the lack of unified effort between State and Defense. Again, Kuwait witnessed strains made workable through personal ties and cooperation.

Haiti, though it may have looked better on paper (it did identify responsibilities), resulted in a divided plan in the worst way--where the military owned only one of three major pillars of the operation yet there was not clear delineation of who would lead the overall effort.

Evaluation

Of all the tests for a grand strategy of conflict-peace transition, evaluation was the most lacking—especially in the planning stages. There was little effort made in the IA community or by senior administration officials to assess risk to the plans' major elements.

It is difficult to assess precisely why there wasn't an emphasis on evaluation earlier in the planning process.   Time, perhaps the most valuable commodity in senior decision-making circles, doesn't allow for a great deal of introspection.   Yet, certainly a plan worthy of the President's direction is one that should require an assessment of its likelihood of success.   The following paragraphs paint a rather discouraging picture of the state of evaluating conflict-peace transition planning.

Aim: The first disconnect pertains to improperly understanding objectives key to the overall transition.   Though errors in this area were kept to a minimum through fairly complete and limited statements of aim in each of the two case studies, Kuwait planning experienced at least two significant mis-steps that might have been caught had transition planning status been summarized sooner.   The first involved CENTCOM's failure to begin detailed transition planning for the liberation of Kuwait until December.   It was a result of several factors, the most important being CENTCOM's desire to keep offensive planning close hold, combined with the fact that it had delegated responsibility for civil affairs to ARCENT.   Since ARCENT was not privy to the close-hold plans, they focused instead on defensive operations within Saudi Arabia (which was the assumption of the on-the-shelf operational plan).[61]

The second problem was a result of CENTCOM not responding to Presidential pronouncements that could have been important transition objectives. In one case, the President made a fairly concerted public-diplomacy campaign during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM encouraging the overthrown of Saddam Hussein. Had CENTCOM responded to the public pronouncements by deriving an additional objective that included supporting an internal overthrow of the Iraqi government, they might have helped bring about a more complete discussion of the President's intentions as he made those statements.[62] Another example involves a less known objective charged to Ambassador Gnehm—to advance the democratization of Kuwait by restoring Kuwait's legislative assembly. This objective was unknown to military planners, so their civil-military operations never directly supported this seemingly important goal.[63] High-level restatements of aim could have helped identify these potential critical objectives for comprehensive planning.

Means: Lack of evaluation during the planning phase failed to capture correctly risk pertaining to the adequacy of resources needed to execute the plan. Most of significant disconnects involved a failure to express whether adequate key personnel existed to plan and execute all major missions properly. In Kuwait, one of the primary reasons for the tug-of-war between CENTCOM and the U.S. Ambassador over ownership of the KTF was due to both organizations' need for these specialized personnel in transition operations.[64] Personnel shortfalls were even more damaging in Haiti. Many civilian agencies involved in the interagency process lacked additional personnel to serve as full-time planners to take part in cumbersome interagency coordination. Moreover, these same civilian organizations were also unable to deploy sufficient personnel to Haiti, "delay[ing] their ability to bring resources to bear in the initial days following the Haiti intervention."[65] One shortfall directly degraded close-

coordination in UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, when the Ambassador and U.S. AID representatives declined to provide staff to participate in a combined "war room" during the operation due to manning shortfalls.[66]   All of these examples of insufficient personnel could have been summarized in statements of risk to mission objectives.

Risk regarding financial resources was an additional problem, though less so in Kuwait. Since Kuwait planning in the interagency process involved the government of Kuwait and its extensive financial resources, fiscal constraints understandably were not viewed as a central risk to the plan's success. For Haiti, however, military planners assumed that money would begin flowing into Haiti as soon as the embargo was lifted and would flow for relief and reconstruction once U.S. forces arrived.[67] Though it's not clear precisely what negative effect this had on early operations, it seems reasonable to assume that the humanitarian crisis and resulting civil instability were not stemmed as quickly as military planners had hoped.

Ways: Many of the problems discussed earlier pertaining to grand strategic ways could have been minimized by summarizing the control relationship between key organizations— possibly stated as risks to unified effort. In the case of early interagency planning for Kuwait, a clear statement of transition responsibilities specific to CENTCOM and the U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait, complete with key transition points, would have gone a long way to smoothing the rough and rapid transitions that did take place.   In Haiti, similar measures could have avoided over-reliance on the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)—an effective operational coordination mechanism between military and non-military organizations, but one that is only an aid to unified effort and not a substitute for unified direction toward grand strategic aims.[68]

Planning Progress: The value of this evaluation category is to capture a variety of problems that lurked just below the surface of the planning process. Had there been a request for

the major agencies involved to report back early on with integrated measures of their progress and interagency coordination, it's possible some of these slippery issues may have been resolved.

Cultural differences between organizations involved in the planning process were sources of significant friction. Each conflict would have experienced fewer adverse effects, had these cultural disconnects surfaced sooner. During both conflicts examined by this study, military planners accused other agencies of lacking the same sense of urgency in the planning process. The Kuwait example was cited earlier. It involved the Kuwaiti-staffed KERP that failed to make what was perceived as adequate progress due to its differing view on negotiating.[69] In Haiti, the criticism was more generalized, pertaining to unspecified non-military organizations.[70] Though it would be unfair to accept either of these claims without letting these non-military agencies speak in their own defense, it does seem reasonable that an earlier attempt in the interagency process to capture planning progress by each major lead-agency would have generated a discussion about any perceived lack of progress. It is possible that such early progress checks might have even caused a questioning of assumptions for Haiti regarding the military's role in "nation building" activities, which the military leadership sought to avoid. As a result of the unquestioned assumptions, members from, "AID did not recognize, until they arrived in country, that they would not be working with military counterparts on developmental activities."[71]

Operational security, as mentioned earlier, is an additional barrier to early effective planning. Though it is an important element for virtually every military operation, security is not cost-free. Both Kuwait and Haiti transition operations suffered security-related delays that could have been at least partially avoided through an early evaluation of the transition plan. Kuwait was the subject of a classic standoff:

> Operational security, combined with Kuwait Task Force's position outside the
> CENTCOM and the ARCENT command chains, prevented the degree of

coordination needed to prepare an effective plan for employing civil affairs. The CENTCOM J-5 asked the task force to send a representative to Riyadh, but the task force declined. The task force asked CENTCOM to send a representative to Washington, but that made little sense to CENTCOM officials because the plans were being drafted in Riyadh.[72]

The result of the unevaluated standoff was a doubly disconnected transition plan in which ARCENT's plans focused first on Saudi Arabia and, later, shorter-term emergency services in Kuwait, while KTF's focus was on the longer-term reconstruction of Kuwait.[73]

Operational security was found to have had similar negative effects on Haiti planning. During an interagency lessons-learned meeting after UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, one of the attendees stated that for transition operations:

> The withholding from civilian agencies, by the military, of basic information on its operational intentions may actually increase rather than minimize the risk of casualties.   …The desirability of achieving, from the start, a maximum synchronization of action by military and civilian elements may militate in favor of a wider sharing of information than is otherwise the norm.[74]

Since many of the elements of a conflict-peace transition plan depend on the likely end state of an earlier combat-intensive military campaign as their starting point, there is a strong argument to be made for evaluations that account for whether the right balance between security and coordination is being struck. It may be only at senior levels of the interagency process that this kind of discussion can take place.

Coping with Uncertainty: The final area of evaluation deals with the unknowable—or a plan's ability to succeed in an uncertain environment. Haiti exhibited the greatest success in this area. Due to the uncertainty of how Haiti's military leadership would resist or cooperate, military planners created both forcible entry and permissible entry operation plans.   This innovation became crucial as negotiations between Haiti's Lieutenant General Cedras and a team led by former President Jimmy Carter had stalled. Only after the execute order for the forcible entry plan had been issued and planes were in the air, did Cedras agree to a peaceful settlement.

The United States had the flexibility at that point to cancel the forcible entry plan and still execute the permissive entry plan the next day.[75]

Kuwait planning witnessed a different kind of flexibility when the U.S. involved Kuwaitis in the transition planning process. When questions of priority arose over reconstruction tasks, the Kuwaitis for the most part were able to resolve them easily. Though such an approach requires a high level of trust in the country's representatives, it may have applicability beyond the Kuwait experience.

Assessment: Evaluation of transition grand strategy was not a priority in either case. The tragedy of this observation is that earlier evaluation could have flagged many significant disconnects. Planners managed to misinterpret statements of aim early on (as the Kuwait OPSEC discussion showed). The President might also have benefited from planners' evaluations of his public pronouncements as secondary goals—especially in Kuwait. Such a discussion might have resulted either in a more detailed transition plan to assist an uprising in Iraq or, had the President so decided, in an elimination of public calls for Saddam Hussein's overthrow.

Means-related evaluation could have identified important risks in both case studies. Shortages of civil affairs personnel in the Kuwait case risked a successful planning and execution of theater-based transition operations, while shortages for Haiti of non-military personnel in a variety of agencies again threatened both the planning and execution of a fully integrated operation. Haiti plans could have also benefited from statements of risk regarding absence of funding figures.

Meanwhile, ways-related evaluation could have identified risks to unified effort—given the absence of clear responsibility for deconfliction in the interagency process and a similar absence of a single authority through which all transition aims would be focused. Such a

discussion could also have included depiction of significant handoffs (which would have painted a confusing picture in Kuwait and may have led to some steps to simplify matters).

Planning intermediate progress checks (or, regular evaluations) are another reason for emphasizing the evaluation phase. Performing these sooner rather than later, while difficult to summarize due to large amounts of incomplete planning, can help to identify disconnects that are the result of cultural differences between organizations. Senior reviewers should also be sensitive to potential over-classification of operational plans. If security precludes making certain information available, senior reviewers should consider other ways to provide useful guidance to transition planners. One of these aids could be the inclusion of ranges of possible outcomes that include "most-likely" occurrences. When security concerns are lessened, these assumptions can be compared to planned end-states and adjusted accordingly.

Final Assessment

As this chapter shows, articulating a grand strategy for conflict-peace transition is far easier to assert on paper than it is to execute in an actual operation. Yet, there is a surprising amount of agreement between the two case studies as reviewed for each of this study's four tests of strategy. Similar agreement exists between the observations found in this chapter and the likely tensions surrounding grand strategy posited in the previous chapter.

In the end, a successful strategy is one that achieves the political aim. Given this relationship, the Kuwait case was a grand strategic victory—though it didn't necessarily look pretty on paper. It managed to enable the liberation and reconstruction of Kuwait in a timely, peaceful, and inclusive manner. Haiti, on the other hand, involved a more thoroughly integrated plan, that resulted in strategic failure. Though its mission and command and control were somewhat divided, the integrated plan accounted for key operational transitions and achieving

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planned end states. What it did not do was to distinguish between achieving success and sustaining success. Though one might argue that this is a function of policy decisions, isn't that really what grand strategy should capture and trace-out to a successful conclusion?[76] As the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter captures so concisely, the conflict-peace transition grand strategy for Haiti fell far short of success in the long-run.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined conflict-peace transition grand strategy in action, evaluating two quite different case studies base on four strategic tests: aim, means, ways, and evaluation. The discussion throughout this chapter identifies both positive aspects of transition grand strategy when it exists, as well as the consequences of its absence. Surprising similarity exists between two case studies that represent quite different portions of the conflict spectrum. Congruity also exists between this chapter's observations and the tensions identified in the chapter 2. This study now moves to its final phase—proposing a practical approach to designing transition grand strategy.

Notes

[1] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.
[2] Ibid, 88.
[3] John T. Fishel, *Civil Military Operations in the New World*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), 209.
[4] B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967), 321-322.
[5] Harold R. Winton, "Introduction to Strategy," lecture, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Al., 12 August 1998.
[6] Civil military operations doctrine refers to "civil components," while others have proposed somewhat similar approaches under the headings of, "sectors," or "categories." See Joint Publication 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, 8 February 2001, I-19; A. Martin Lidy and Samuel H. Packer, *The United States' Military Role in Smaller Scale Contingencies-*

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Executive Summary, IDA Report Document IDA-D-2349 (Alexandria, Va.: IDA, August 2000), 5-6; and Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 29 January 2003), 13-20.

[7] Daniel S. Papp, "The Gulf War Coalition: The Politics and Economics of a Most Unusual Alliance," in *The Eagle in the Desert: Looking Back on U.S. Involvement in the Persian Gulf War*, ed. William Head and Earl H. Tilford, Jr., (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), 22.

[8] United States Atlantic Command, *Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: US Forces in Haiti*, May 1997, 5.

[9] Papp, 37.

[10] Ibid., 41-42, and Michael T. Corgan, "Clausewitz's *On War* and the Gulf War" in *The Eagle in the Desert: Looking Back on U.S. Involvement in the Persian Gulf War*, ed. William Head and Earl H. Tilford, Jr., (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), 275.

[11] Fishel, 239.

[12] Ibid., 7.

[13] Ibid., 213.

[14] United States Atlantic Command, A1-A3.

[15] Ibid., C-2.

[16] Janet A. McDonnell, *After DESERT STORM: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Government Printing Office, 1999), 17.; The Secretary of State did not formally reply until mid-December, though planning efforts hit high gear around mid October.

[17] Ibid., 47-8.

[18] Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Government Printing Office, 1996), 32.

[19] United States Atlantic Command, A-1.

[20] Hayes, 13; David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001), 272; and Donald E. Schulz, *Whither Haiti* (U.S. Army War College, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1 April 1996), 20.

[21] Fishel, 220.

[22] Ibid., 157, and McDonnell, 32.

[23] Fishel, 137.

[24] Ibid., 139.

[25] McDonnell, 16.

[26] Ibid., 15.

[27] Ibid., 17.

[28] Fishel, 140.

[29] Ibid, 140.

[30] Hayes, 33.

[31] Hayes, 29.

[32] United States Atlantic Command, 53.

[33] McDonnell, 23.

[34] Ibid., 21.

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[35] Ibid., 17, 22.
[36] Ibid., 31.
[37] Fishel, 139.
[38] Ibid., 139
[39] Hayes, 13-14.
[40] Ibid., 25-26.
[41] Ibid, 34, 37.
[42] Ibid, 35.
[43] Ibid., 16.
[44] McDonnell, 28, 38, 60.
[45] Fishel, 135-137.
[46] Ibid., 148
[47] McDonnell, 57.
[48] Ibid., 99, and Fishel, 169.
[49] Fishel, 169, and McDonnell, 105. Note: Fishel states, "The Kuwait Emergency Recovery Program (KERP), on January 4, 1991, asked the corps to manage recovery efforts for the initial 90-day emergency phase after liberation. Ten days later, the government of Kuwait signed a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case… for $46.3 million for the corps to provide emergency repairs and damage assessments during the initial 90-day period. To manage this effort, the corps created the Kuwait Emergency Recovery Office (KERO)."
[50] McDonnell, 40-41.
[51] Ibid., 54-57.
[52] Ibid., 99.
[53] Ibid., 93-94.
[54] United States Atlantic Command, A1-A3.
[55] Ibid., 51.
[56] Ibid., 51.
[57] Fishel, 148.
[58] Ibid., 170.
[59] Hayes, 42-43.
[60] Ibid., 55.
[61] Fishel, 144-145.
[62] Corgan, 274, and Fishel, 241.
[63] Fishel, 240.
[64] Ibid., 166. Though in this case, KTF members did actually augment the embassy staff for a period of time. One other example is worth noting here. On pages 143-145, Fishel highlighted the fact that CENTCOM planners during the early phase of DESERT SHIELD also lacked sufficient numbers of civil affairs officers to perform detailed transition planning. However, the component charged with that planning (ARCENT) did not realize the shortfall existed, due to the additional disconnect mentioned earlier in this section resulting in the misperception that ARCENT should be focusing on a defense of Saudi Arabia plan.
[65] Hayes, 39 and 53.
[66] Ibid., 43.
[67] Ibid, 38.

Notes

[68] Fishel, 248.

[69] McDonnell, 31.

[70] United States Atlantic Command, 7.

[71] Hayes, 40-41.

[72] McDonnell, 33.

[73] Ibid., 33-34.

[74] Hayes, 54.

[75] United States Atlantic Command, 11-12.

[76] Robert Oakley and Michael Dziedzic, Sustaining Success in Haiti, Number 77 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, June 1996), 1.

Chapter 4

Enabling American Leadership

Thus the history of JCS 1067 represents in an exceedingly painful way the absence of effective working relations, as well as of satisfactory procedural and organizational devices, between the Army and the civilian agencies. …State kept overlooking the very practical problems that Eisenhower would face if he had to rely on the Control Council for instructions, the Army showed an almost total unwillingness to assist in the rehabilitation of Western Europe—even to glance, so to speak, outside the borders of the U.S. zone, and an avoidance of policy for Germany except in relation to the interests of its own armed forces.

— Harold Stein
"Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy" [1]

This study began by asserting that the President can better achieve successful transition from conflict to peace by crafting grand strategy that specifically addresses this period of transition. The second chapter made a strong case in favor of such a strategy, citing numerous advantages along the way. However, it tempered these benefits with a discussion of several real disincentives that could diminish in the eyes of the President the value of a comprehensive grand strategy. Chapter three presented a four-part definition of strategy amenable to observation and then compared two case studies across each of the four areas.

The results so far argue in favor of conflict peace transition grand strategy--for all the reasons outlined in chapter two in addition to the need for interagency direction identified in chapter three. Yet, as the end of second chapter and most of the third chapter remind the reader, it isn't realistic to expect transition guidance far in advance of combat operations. Part of the

good news to counter this tendency lies in the inherent ability and professionalism of those who work the transition seam, from Army and Marine civil affairs forces, to US AID personnel, to a host of other federal agencies, plus national and international organizations. But the question remains, are all these good people headed the right way?

Shaping A Practical Approach

This study proposes a practical approach to transition grand strategy that recognizes the promise of grand strategy as a source of national purpose, accountability and unified action toward important strategic aims. It also recognizes the need to balance such an understanding against the President's need for options.   The product of this balancing act is a three-tracked approach to conflict-peace transition grand strategy that involves: presidential intent, an accountable and flexible interagency process, and regular evaluation of the integrated strategy. Done right, it will be a valuable tool to help the nation plan and execute transition events better.

Presidential Intent

To the fullest extent possible, the President should communicate his intent for desired outcome of a conflict-peace transition event. If specifying portions of that vision is either not feasible or unacceptably reduces the President's options, then the alternative is to defer statements of national aim to the interagency process. Barring other Presidential direction, senior National Security Council members (and the NSC staff) would then become responsible for translating existing public statements made by the President into draft statements of national aim[2]. These statements could then be revisited, either as a result of international negotiations (resulting in UN Security Council Resolutions, for example) or when reaching the third track— evaluation.

Accountable and Flexible Interagency Process

The purpose of this second track is to better focus the planning activities within the interagency process. It begins with a delineation of a lead interagency authority authorized to break planning logjams. It follows with an executive management (or command) concept that will apply during the execution of transition operations. Certainly this concept may involve a transfer of executive responsibilities at some point during the operation. In most cases guidance, if not coming directly from the President, will need to be the result of cabinet-level discussions that (assuming less than unanimous approval by the principal stakeholders) will require presidential review and approval.

Next, interagency plans need to incorporate as much as possible the ranges of possible events that could effect the outcome of transition operations. This approach is a response to the uncertainties in the transition-planning environment (resulting from incomplete statements of aim, security constraints, or the inability to predict the precise outcome of a conflict). As mentioned earlier in this paper, the statements of likely variance still should include a "most-likely" occurrence, around which most detailed planning and coordination can be done.

Closely linked to the notion of including variance in predicted transition events is the need to educate planners in the interagency environment (as well as operational planners and those involved in the execution phase) to ensure they have realistic expectations regarding the amount of guidance they will receive. Planners should count on at least draft statements of aim. However, as previous chapters illustrated, means-related guidance may be scant. They will also need to become comfortable with summarizing the nature of their integration with other agencies, even when planning efforts are far from complete.

Finally, interagency doctrine will need to capture the dynamics of this unique planning environment. Currently there is no equivalent to the Clinton Administration's Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56):

> Promulgated to establish how the USG will manage its interagency involvement in future complex contingencies and achieve unity of effort with participating international organizations. PDD-56 requir[ed] a Political-Military Implementation Plan… to be developed and used to coordinate USG activities within the interagency process, and with other organizations participating in complex contingencies. The plan developed for a contingency will include a situation assessment, as mission statement, agency objectives, and the desired end state.[3]

Though purely speculation, it may be that the detail contained in this PDD was excessive for NSC-level guidance in this current administration. Certainly the detail is appropriate for operational planning. In fact, a similar template was as a starting point to create a comprehensive Political-Military Plan during the U.S. Joint Forces Command-sponsored exercise, Millenium Challenge 2002.[4] However, a much smaller subset of the information contained in the Pol-Mil plan is probably appropriate for summarizing the status of intent, planning, and execution at the senior executive level. Detailed doctrine probably needs to reside at a level lower than NSC ownership. Precisely where will depend on the ability of the largest government agencies to achieve a reasonable degree of cooperation.[5]

Regular Evaluation of Integrated Strategy

This final track will depend on advancing the art of summarizing and depicting, for executive review, the complexities of interagency planning. Evaluations would begin with restatements of strategic aim and additional presidential intent. It would also include the concept of the nature of interagency collaboration (if necessary) and international collaboration (more necessary as a guide for how heavily we intend to rely on non-U.S. and non-governmental organizations). Key ways-related information also appears here—including both interagency

and operational (execution) concepts of command or executive management. It would also

summarize the flow of the operation over time. Creating such a display is no simple task. While

it is relatively easy to depict the theoretical time flow of transition operations [see figure 1],

Figure 1 Theoretical Case[6]

real-life details can result in information overload. Even the fairly straightforward display of

critical tasks, arranged by sub-phases of a transition operation, quickly becomes complex [see

figure 2].

Figure 2 Sample Display of Critical Tasks by Transition Phase[7]

Finally, IA leadership would cover planning progress—capturing the status of cross-agency coordination and synchronization while also highlighting any significant disconnects (resulting from cultural differences or security constraints, for example).

Limitations

It is important to emphasize that the recommendations in the previous section are based on only two case studies. Though they were selected to bracket the conflict spectrum, Kuwait especially (as this paper's major combat operation) is very much a best-case scenario. The Kuwait case was a transition event that resulted primarily in the liberation of Kuwait (the occupation of Iraqi territory surrounding Kuwait was of very limited duration). It featured an intact government in exile that had access to a very substantial level of financial resources, and it

had the ability to provide personnel to assist in both the planning and execution of transition operations. Still, it is interesting to note the level of commonality observed when comparing the two case studies across the four strategic tests. One must conclude that even under the best of circumstances, conflict-peace transition events are complex undertakings that can easily devolve into confusion and infighting.

Current transition events underway in both Afghanistan and Iraq also cause one to reconsider the validity of this study's recommendations. Combat operations in Iraq have presented a conflict-peace transition situation of a complexity that dwarfs the concluding phase of Operation DESERT STORM. Yet, early indications offer some reassurance that the general nature of conflict-peace transition grand strategy, outlined in this paper, remain quite valid. As in the other case studies, the President has given guidance fairly late in the transition planning process for Iraq.[8] Moreover, Defense and State have experienced a significant degree of tension over roles, responsibilities, and operational concepts that form the backbone of the transition strategy.[9] Finally, strategic uncertainty has affected this conflict and the resulting transition strategy in marked ways—from Turkey's very limited overall cooperation combined with its extreme sensitivity to the actions of Iraqi Kurds, to the promise of an increasingly limited role for the United Nations in transition operations.

Implications

It is impossible to do justice in the scope of this one paper to the plethora of issues and activities that must flow from these recommendations to enable successful conflict-peace transition operations. Here are just a few of the important and interesting implications resulting from this study.

Executive Template

A great deal of the value of transition grand strategy to the President will depend on how well the complexity of the interagency planning process and the transition plan itself can be communicated concisely and effectively.

Organizational Challenges

There is a limit to the number of transition grand strategies that the NSC can direct for the President. Also, it is possible that the transaction costs resulting from the interagency process could become too great. What events might merit integration of cabinet-level organizations charged with activities outside the borders of the United States?

Balance between Military and Civilian Transition Capabilities

One of the arguments cited by an interagency process lessons-learned meeting in favor of military control of transition operations was that other agencies were not staffed to do it properly. How might it be possible to make non-DoD organizations better able to plan and execute in response to crises?

New Concepts for Framing Resource Options

A final area of innovation includes improvements to articulating how lead agencies will partner with NGOs and other organizations during transition operations. As mentioned in the second chapter, NGOs operate according to charters that might not fit perfectly (if at all) with U.S. objectives. Are there ways of setting up a market for transition services that would help accomplish U.S objectives in ways acceptable to NGOs?

Conclusion

This chapter synthesizes the theory of chapter two and the observations of chapter three to propose a practical and realistic approach to conflict-peace transition grand strategy. This three-tracked approach involves communication of presidential intent, an accountable and flexible interagency process, and regular evaluation of the integrated strategy. Certainly such an approach is not a panacea. However, effective management of the crafting and sustainment of such a transition strategy has a number of likely implications including: developing effective methods of depicting interagency planning efforts as well as operational execution in the field; managing the additional workload at the National Security Council level; ensuring the proper agencies have the resources necessary to actually plan and execute their part of the transition; and developing new ways of conceptualizing partnerships with non-U.S. and non-governmental organizations that help communicate the costs and benefits of those partnerships

Notes

[1] Harold Stein, "Editorial Comments [to Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy]," in *American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies*, ed. Harold Stein (Birmingham, Al.: University of Alabama Press, 1963), 464.

[2] For example, "the NSC [could] establish a common set of assumptions for all departments and agencies to use if the President is reluctant to declare his strategic guidance," for transition events. Notes, from review of draft version of this paper, A. Martin Lidy, 15 April 2003.

[3] A. Martin Lidy and Samuel H. Packer, *The United States' Military Role in Smaller Scale Contingencies-Executive Summary*, IDA Report Document IDA-D-2349 (Alexandria, Va.: IDA, August 2000), 3.

[4] US Joint Forces Command, Joint Experimentation, *Political-Military Plan for Country Red Instability and Hostilities (Operation Sovereign Passage)*, Millennium Challenge 2002; the following comments from A. Martin Lidy are also helpful. "The generic political-military (pol-mil) plan is an educational aid for government officials, including both military and civilian, to facilitate coordination and planning for a complex contingency operation. The first generic pol-mil plan was developed in 1995 to facilitate interagency training activities. Since that time, the generic pol-mil plan content has been updated periodically to capture lessons learned from recently conducted missions. Accordingly, the generic plan should be viewed as a "living document" because it integrates recent "best practices" under the Advance Planning Process, the methodology used within the interagency process to complete policy planning tasks at the

strategic level in anticipation of a complex emergency. The generic document should be viewed as a representative plan since an actual pol-mil plan often varies somewhat due to specific policy planning requirements for a particular operation. Nonetheless, the format and content of this generic plan are very similar to those produced by the interagency since 1996." Notes, from review of draft version of this paper, A. Martin Lidy, 15 April 2003.

[5] Creating interagency doctrine in the past has not been easy. A. Martin Lidy provides the following comments resulting from IDA's evaluation of the DoD response to Hurricanes Georges and Mitch. "One of the major findings was that there was no interagency process for foreign disasters comparable to the Federal Response Plan (FRP) for domestic disasters. The FRP was produced by FEMA to coordinate the activities of 27 departments and agencies and the American Red Cross (an NGO that receives some funding from the USG) with 50 sovereign states. It took 18 years of interagency negotiation after the Congress provided authorizing legislation to publish the first agreed FRP. Based on these findings and our recommendation, USAID was tasked by the NSC to develop such a plan for foreign disasters. …Unfortunately, timing is everything, and the plan fell between the cracks during the USG administration change over. …It was subsequently resurrected and will be used in the JFCOM interagency experimentation later this year." Notes, from review of draft version of this paper, A. Martin Lidy, 15 April 2003.

[6] Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 29 January 2003), 4.

[7] Ibid., 3.

[8] Karen DeYoung, "Role for Exile Leaders Urged: Rumsfeld Proposes Interim Authority in Southern Iraq," *Washington Post*, 4 April 2003.

[9] Karen DeYoung and Peter Slevin, "Pentagon, State Spar On Team to Run Iraq," *Washington Post*, 1 April, 2003; and David E. Sanger, "Bush's Next Role: Mediator in Disputes Over Running Postwar Iraq," *New York Times*, 8 April 2003.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, and of one's people, is better after the war than before.

—B.H. Liddell Hart
Strategy[1]

This paper has argued that the President can better achieve strategic follow-through by crafting strategy that specifically addresses conflict-peace transition events. This grand strategy could serve as a unifying mechanism through which the President exercises strategic leadership over the vast number of often loosely affiliated organizations involved in such operations. This study has made its case by first identifying the many advantages afforded by a transition grand strategy, while also including some realistic constraints that limit the ideal. A following chapter compared two case studies that bracketed the conflict spectrum, as a way of examining transition grand strategy in action. Both cases exhibited a surprising degree of similarity both in terms of what worked and what failed. This study concluded with a recommended three-tracked approach to transition grand strategy that involves communication of presidential intent, an accountable and flexible interagency process, and regular evaluation of the integrated strategy.

Strategy does make a difference. At its best, it can clarify aim, unify effort, and serve as a map to victory. At its worst, it can obfuscate efforts in a resource-constrained environment and give one's opponent undeserved advantage. Grand strategy in the complex world of conflict-peace transition holds great promise, but only if the President embraces it as tool for applying his

leadership to achieve decisive political results. It's not an easy process to manage. In fact, as the going gets tougher in war, long-term plans tend to get pushed aside by concerns about surviving until the next day. This is exactly where the argument for conflict-peace transition grand strategy is strongest. It keeps political aim at the forefront. Because, in the avalanche called war, when the snow does eventually stop crashing down the mountain, transition grand strategy may be the final push that helps a successful political outcome see the light of day.

Notes

[1] B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1967), 357.

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